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Civil Procedure:
Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation1
Scott Dodson
Personal jurisdiction—the adjudicatory authority of a court over a
party—nominally has little directly to do with the ability of claims or
parties to join together. But recent decisions from the Supreme Court
cabining the reach of courts’ personal jurisdiction over defendants—
including last Term’s bombshell Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior
Court2—have imbued personal jurisdiction with a powerful
disaggregation effect by requiring a close connection between the
forum state, each defendant, and each claim. The Court’s new
restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction means that similarly
situated plaintiffs injured in different states are unlikely to be able to
sue codefendants from different states in the same lawsuit. Even as
against a single defendant, plaintiffs residing in the same state might
not be able to join together in the same lawsuit if they were injured in
different states.3 The resulting disaggregation causes waste and
unfairness to the parties and the system. In this chapter, I tell the story
of personal jurisdiction and aggregation.
The Law’s Preference for Aggregation
Nearly everyone benefits in some form from aggregation. Courts,
plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses alike benefit from increased
efficiency, the avoidance of duplicative litigation, and consistency in
judgments and precedent.
The law thus prefers aggregation. Joinder of claims under Rules
13 and 18 are liberally permissive and sometimes even compulsory.4
Joinder of parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24 is likewise easy and
sometimes mandatory.5 Federal law permits class actions and

1. Summarized and excerpted from Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction
and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2018).
2. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
3. Plaintiffs could join together in the defendant’s home state, but only if
the home state (or country, if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen) allows such
aggregation.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 18.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 14, 19, 20, 24.
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collective actions for efficient purposes.6
Principles of claim
preclusion enforce these liberal-joinder norms.
The law even
encourages consolidation of separate cases together for coordinated
resolution, through Rule 42 or multidistrict litigation.7 Supplemental
jurisdiction and other special statutes facilitate joinder by supplying
broadened federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction.8
Of course, aggregation is not an unalloyed good. Aggregation can
generate confusion, delay, and unfairness. But for the most part,
aggregation’s risks are minor compared to its upside.9 And the rules of
aggregation already contain tools to mitigate its risks, by prioritizing
only efficient joinder and enabling judicial discretion to disaggregate
when warranted.10 The point here is that regulating the scope of
aggregation on its own terms makes sense. But recent decisions from
the Supreme Court have drastically curtailed aggregation even though
the decisions themselves address an issue having little to do with
aggregation doctrinally: personal jurisdiction.
The Turning of Personal Jurisdiction
The story of personal jurisdiction is a tortuous one, but, until 2011,
it was largely in tandem with the law’s preference for aggregation.
Under general personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs could join together to sue
a single defendant in any forum in which the defendant had continuous
and systematic contacts, even if the plaintiffs’ claims arose in different
states.11 And the combination of broad general jurisdiction, fairnessbased specific jurisdiction, and enhancement from the plaintiff’s forum
contacts often enabled a plaintiff to find a common forum with personal

6. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1407; FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (interpleader), 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
9. Some parties strategically oppose aggregation for reasons unintended
by the law. Class-action defendants, for example, may oppose aggregation of
plaintiffs because they suspect that many cases will be too costly for plaintiffs
to litigate individually. But the law rightly denies that such a reason is a
legitimate basis to oppose aggregation; to the contrary, a primary goal of
aggregation is to enable litigation that might be too inefficient or uneconomical
to pursue individually.
10. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
11. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Toward a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
207, 214 (2014).
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jurisdiction over multiple opponents, thus facilitating joinder of
defendants.12
When a conflict between personal jurisdiction and aggregation did
arise, the conflict was invariably resolved in favor of aggregation. A
plaintiff opposing a counterclaim was deemed to have consented to
personal jurisdiction for that claim.13 Personal jurisdiction over class
plaintiffs was relaxed to enable class certification.14 Congress
expanded the statutory reach of federal court personal jurisdiction when
necessary to enable joinder by interpleader.15 And lower courts
adopted a doctrine of “pendent personal jurisdiction” to cover all
related claims by a single plaintiff against a single defendant when
some of the claims would subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction
in the forum but others would not.16
The story of personal jurisdiction—and of its relationship to
aggregation—took an abrupt turn in 2011 with a series of cases that
narrowed personal jurisdiction. In a trio of general jurisdiction cases,
the Court replaced the “continuous and systematic” test with the
“essentially at home” test, which limits general jurisdiction to one (for
individuals) or at most two (for corporations) states.17 And in a
different trio of specific-jurisdiction cases, the Court required, for
specific jurisdiction, a direct links among the forum, the defendant, and
the claim,18 connections that limit the number of common forums in a
case involving multiple parties or claims.
These cases narrowing personal jurisdiction affect aggregation in a
variety of ways. The Court’s insistence on a connection between the
12. E.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784–89 (1984).
13. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938).
14. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2361.
16. See Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174,
1180–81 (9th Cir. 2004).
17. BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915 (2011).
18. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)
(holding that plaintiffs not harmed in California could not join with plaintiffs
harmed in California to assert personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb
in California for the same kinds of harm); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115,
1122 (2014) (constraining specific jurisdiction to the contacts that the
defendant—as opposed to the plaintiff—creates with the forum); J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality) (demanding
purposeful contacts by the defendant with the particular forum rather than with
the United States as a whole).
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claim and the forum calls into doubt the doctrine of pendent personal
jurisdiction for claim joinder. As for party joinder, plaintiffs seeking to
join together as a class or under Rule 20 against a single defendant,19 or
a plaintiff seeking to sue multiple defendants, will have more difficulty
finding a common forum with personal jurisdiction for all claims—and
there may be no common U.S. forum for a foreign defendant.20 And
although case consolidation under the MDL statute is, according to the
JPML, essentially immune from personal-jurisdiction strictures,21
recent scholarship has challenged that assessment,22 meaning that the
Court’s restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction may drastically limit
MDL as well.
Expanding Personal Jurisdiction for Aggregation
The solution in federal court to these tensions between personal
jurisdiction and aggregation is to expand the statutory or rule
authorization for federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in
aggregation cases.
The typical way for Congress or the rulemakers to establish the
scope of personal jurisdiction in federal courts is through authorization
of service of process. The broadest grant of personal jurisdiction to
federal courts would be to allow nationwide personal jurisdiction to the
extent permitted by the Constitution over all parties and claims in a
multiclaim or multiparty lawsuit. This would give maximum flexibility
for aggregation purposes by essentially removing all personaljurisdiction barriers to aggregation, with the possible exception of alien

19. Class action joinder presents trickier issues than ordinary joinder
because a class action exhibits some features of an independent entity. See
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (looking only to the named
representatives’ citizenships for determining the citizenship of a non-CAFA
class for diversity-jurisdiction purposes); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (specifying
that the entire amount claimed by a CAFA class is the amount in controversy
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). It is unclear how the Court’s new
conception of specific jurisdiction applies to Rule 23 joinder.
20. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and
Aliens, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1205 (2018) (“For alien defendants, by contrast, the
likelihood is that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.”).
21. In re FMC Corp. Patent Litig. 422 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.L.
1976); In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1141
(J.P.M.L. 1969).
22. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018); Scott Dodson, Plaintiff Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. REV. (2019).
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defendants whose connections to the United States are so attenuated
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court would
violate the Constitution.
The breadth of this formulation could lead to some odd results
from the perspective of personal jurisdiction. For example, a single
plaintiff from California could sue a single defendant from Oregon in
Florida federal court for two claims arising in California; based solely
on the presence of multiple claims, Florida would have personal
jurisdiction despite the lack of any Florida connection to the parties or
the claims.
But even were such oddities to occur under the broad version of
nationwide personal jurisdiction, they would be largely corrected by the
venue statute,23 which would limit proper venue in the case above to a
federal court in Oregon (where the defendant resides) or a federal court
in California (where the claims arose). For unusual cases that the
venue statute does not catch, the venue-transfer statute will allow
transfer to a more sensible forum.24 Plaintiffs could try to use
nationwide personal jurisdiction to shop for particularly favorable state
law,25 but the Constitution imposes limits on the application of the law
of states with no connection to the dispute.26 And Congress could
easily change the choice-of-law rules for venue transfer in this context
to protect against unfair law-shopping.
If national personal jurisdiction is unpalatable, more limited
permutations are possible. For example, the doctrine of pendent
personal jurisdiction could be codified to allow a federal court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant as to all claims asserted
by a single plaintiff if the federal court has personal jurisdiction under
Rule 4(k) as to at least one of those claims. Or, personal jurisdiction
could be expanded to track the supplemental-jurisdiction statute,
effectively providing for personal jurisdiction whenever joinder is
allowed by the rules and not prohibited by limitations of subject-matter
jurisdiction, as long as personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k) is proper
for one of the original claims. Like the supplemental-jurisdiction
statute, and consistent with the joinder-based protections against
prejudice, such joinder-based personal jurisdiction could even be
discretionary, such that a court could decline to exercise personal

23.
24.
25.
26.

28 U.S.C. § 1391.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1980).
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jurisdiction over a defendant for a particular claim if doing so would be
unfair or intrude upon notions of interstate federalism.
Any such expansion of personal jurisdiction exercised by federal
courts would be constitutional. Although the question of whether the
Constitution permits federal courts to exercise nationwide personal
jurisdiction has never been decided by the Supreme Court,27 the Court
has hinted in the affirmative,28 and commentators nearly uniformly
agree that the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise nationwide
personal jurisdiction based upon a national-contacts test.29 After all,
Congress already has provided for nationwide personal jurisdiction in
federal court on a number of specified claims,30 some of which were
specifically for purposes of facilitating joinder.31
An important objection is that aggregation is already too liberal,
and expanding personal jurisdiction will enable more opportunities for
aggregation. Even were that true, the appropriate way to address
excessive aggregation is on aggregation’s own terms, not through a
doctrine having little to do with aggregation. The aggregation rules and
statutes are up to the challenge of balancing the virtues and vices on
their own; there is no need to complicate matters through the
convoluted morass of personal jurisdiction.

27. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784
(2017) (leaving “open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court”);
Omni Capital Int’l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103 n.5 (1987)
(reserving the same question); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality) (same).
28. See, e.g., Miss. Pub’g Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946)
(stating that “Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the
United States”); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838) (stating that
“Congress might have authorized civil process from any circuit court, to have
run into any State of the Union”); cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fifth Amendment requires
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole).
29. See, e.g., Dodge & Dodson, supra note 20 (calling this “an easy
proposition”).
30. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (Federal Arbitration Act); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (Sherman
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77v (Securities Act of 1933);
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Securities Act of 1934); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (RICO); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1332(e)(2) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (CERCLA).
31. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1397, 2361 (interpleader); FED. R. BANKR. P.
7004(d), (f) (bankruptcy).
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Conclusion
A new restrictive turn in personal jurisdiction threatens the salutary
benefits of aggregation in federal civil litigation. The solution is for
Congress or the rulemakers to authorize expanded personal jurisdiction
for aggregation cases. Such an effort would be constitutional and
consistent with the spirit of the federal rules of joinder.
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